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HAVING AIMS 
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ABSTRACT: David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds 
that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that 
aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, 
then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded to this 
objection by appealing to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be 
weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-
Petersen has since responded to our defence of Owens’s objection. Here we reply to 
Steglich-Petersen and conclude, once again, that Owens’s challenge to the truth-aim 
approach remains to be answered.  
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1. Common Ground  
Let us identify the common ground from which we and Steglich-Petersen begin. 
First, it is a necessary condition on aims that they are weighable.1 Second, doxastic 
deliberation (deliberation over whether to believe that p) exhibits exclusivity to 
truth considerations2 (indeed, Steglich-Petersen3 has appealed to the aim of belief 
in explaining why this is so). The putative aim of belief then is not weighable in 
the context of doxastic deliberation. On these two points, all parties agree.  
                                                                
1 To our knowledge, of all the responses to Owens’s objection, no one has taken issue with this 
condition on aims.  
2 Conor McHugh has responded to Owens’s objection by denying that deliberation over what to 
believe involves exclusivity to truth considerations, and thus the aim of belief can indeed be 
weighed, in that very context (Conor McHugh, “The Illusion of Exclusivity,” European Journal 
of Philosophy 23 (2013): 1117-1136). We also think this response to Owens is unsuccessful (see 
Sophie Archer, “Exclusivity Defended,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2015), doi: 
10.1111/phpr.12268; and Ema Sullivan-Bissett, “Aims and Exclusivity,” European Journal of 
Philosophy (2017), DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12183.  
3 Asbjørn Steglich–Petersen, “Does Doxastic Transparency Support Evidentialism?” Dialectica 
62, 4 (2008): 541-547, 546. 
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2. Steglich-Petersen’s Reply (20094) to Owens (20035) 
In reply, Steglich-Petersen identified other deliberative contexts in which the 
truth-aim can be weighed. He gave examples of the truth-aim being weighable 
insofar as it can be discarded in the context of deliberation over whether to form a 
belief about p (that is, whether to enter doxastic deliberation over whether p). 
Considerations speaking in favour of discarding the truth-aim and not forming a 
belief about whether p might be ones relating to the cognitive resources one is 
willing or able to devote to the task, or the consequences which might follow 
from forming a belief about p.  
3. Our Response (20136)  
In response we made two points. First, in the cases Steglich-Petersen discusses, we 
should not say that the agents weigh the truth-aim and discard it in favour of 
other considerations, rather, the truth-aim does not require consideration. This is 
because agents are not required by the truth-aim to form beliefs, rather, it is only 
that if that is what an agent is up to, then the beliefs which she comes to have had 
better be true ones. This was captured by Owens’s formulation of the truth-aim in 
terms of truth being a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for forming a belief 
that p. 
Second, Steglich-Petersen equivocates between deliberating over whether 
to form a belief about p, and deliberating over whether to believe that p. In the 
former context, there is no adoption of the truth-aim. If an agent decides not to 
form a belief about p, Steglich-Petersen claims that she discards the truth-aim. But 
this is incorrect. Rather, the decision not to form a belief about p has been 
informed by a cognitive process prior to that of belief formation. The agent has 
not already adopted the truth-aim for p, and so is not weighing one aim against 
another. Truth is only a constraint upon what proposition one believes if one is in 
the business of forming a belief about a subject matter.  
 
 
                                                                
4 Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, “Weighing the Aim of Belief,” Philosophical Studies 145 (2009): 
395-405. 
5 David Owens, “Does Belief Have an Aim?” Philosophical Studies 115 (2003): 283-305.  
6 Ema Sullivan-Bissett and Paul Noordhof, “A Defence of Owens’ Exclusivity Objection to 
Beliefs Having Aims,” Philosophical Studies 163 (2013): 453-457.  
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4. Steglich-Petersen’s Counter (20177) and Replies  
Steglich-Petersen makes three points in reply to our previous defence of Owens’s 
objection. Here, we take each in turn and offer a response, before making a final 
point.  
4.1. If and only if  
Owens characterized the truth-aim as one in which the truth of p was necessary 
(but not sufficient) for belief that p. This was so as not to attribute to believers the 
aim of believing all true propositions. We noted that Steglich-Petersen accepts 
Owens’s characterization of the truth-aim, and eschews the if and only if 
conception.8  
In reply, he claims that it is unclear why we took the if and only if 
conception to be eschewed by him.9 To this we note that if Steglich-Petersen was 
operating with the if and only if conception in his response to Owens, it was 
dialectically strange to characterize the truth-aim as Owens does, draw on it, and 
then fail to note that Owens had not characterized it in the right way, and that an 
alternative conception of the truth-aim would be operated with instead. Putting 
matters of interpretation aside though, Steglich-Petersen is now clear that he 
characterizes the truth-aim as one which has truth as sufficient for belief that p, 
but as not being vulnerable to the worry raised by Owens. This invulnerability is 
down to believers having the aim with respect to particular propositions, or classes 
of propositions, and not having a general aim of believing all true propositions. 
Previously we prefigured a way of responding to us which had structurally 
similar features to Steglich-Petersen’s position without talking of aims for local 
sets of propositions. We noted that any move to ‘if and only if’ might be meant not 
“as part of an alternative formulation of the truth aim but rather a description of 
what the agent is up to – given that it is now settled for him or her that he or she 
will arrive at a belief concerning whether or not the proposition is true.”10  
This conception of the truth-aim must pave a middle way between believers 
aiming to believe all the propositions which are true, and believers aiming to have 
only true beliefs. This middle way is restricted (so as to rule out the best avoided 
truth as sufficient construal), but is more liberal than applying only to those 
propositions subjected to doxastic deliberation (to rule out the only if construal). 
                                                                
7 Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen “Weighing the Aim of Belief Again,” Logos & Episteme, this issue.  
8 Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof, “A Defence of Owens,” 454. 
9 Steglich-Petersen “Weighing Again,” 144. 
10 Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof, “A Defence of Owens,” 454. 
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The thought is that the aim kicks in for those propositions one considers adopting 
the truth-aim for, and then, the truth-aim can be weighed insofar as it can be 
discarded if the agent decides not to subject the proposition(s) to doxastic 
deliberation.  
This conception of the truth-aim might help Steglich-Petersen’s position 
only if it is the same aim which is present in doxastic deliberation, and the 
deliberative context which precedes it. (Later we suggest, contra Steglich-
Petersen, that it is not, see §4.3, and even if it is, that does not yet do the work, see 
§4.4). 
4.2. Conditional Aims and Weighing 
For the sake of argument, Steglich-Petersen grants that the truth-aim is best 
construed in terms of truth as merely necessary for belief. But he says, in cases of 
so-called conditional aims (where one aims to ϕ only if some other condition 
obtains), it is not the case that other aims and considerations cannot be weighed 
against the conditional aim. He gives the example of the aim to go to staff 
meetings only if there will be cake, and suggests that pursuing this aim may 
conflict with one’s other aims (e.g., maintaining good relations with the 
Department Chair), and these other aims are relevant in deliberation over 
whether to adopt the cake-aim.  
This case is not to the point, since it was no part of our claim that 
conditional aims cannot be weighed. We were not taking issue with the structure 
of the truth-aim (its being conditional), but with the examples Steglich-Petersen 
used to demonstrate contexts in which that aim was weighed. We do not deny 
that there can be consideration of whether to adopt conditional aims; the truth-
aim does indeed share with other conditional aims that a context preceding the 
aim’s adoption can involve deliberation over whether to adopt the aim. 
Nevertheless, there is an important difference between the truth-aim and other 
conditional aims, which, we take it, is the basis of Owens’s original concern. With 
conditional aims, it is possible to adopt the aim, the relevant condition for ϕ-ing 
not be met, and yet ϕ nevertheless. If I adopt the aim to go to staff meetings only if 
there is cake, it is possible for me to decide to go even though there is not cake 
(perhaps the meeting is especially important). Or if I adopt the aim to run only if 
it is sunny, it is possible for me to decide to run, even if it is not sunny (perhaps I 
am training for a marathon) (examples can be multiplied). But the analogous 
situation is ruled out in the case of the truth-aim: if I take up the truth-aim for 
some proposition p and enter into deliberation over whether to believe that p, 
once I answer the question whether p in the negative or even fail to answer it in 
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the positive (and so the condition for belief is not met), I cannot form the belief 
that p. There is no parallel possibility of going ahead in spite of the condition not 
being met in the case of belief.  
Steglich-Petersen is aware of this feature of belief formation but maintains 
it is still appropriate to characterize it as guided by the aim of truth. But given the 
difference identified, he needs to explain why this difference – not present in 
other cases – does not threaten the substantial use of aim talk here. We give 
reasons for supposing it does below (§4.4).  
4.3. Equivocation 
We argued that deliberating over whether to form a belief about p (to adopt the 
truth-aim for p) is not part of the belief-forming process. That if an agent is 
deliberating over whether to be guided by the truth-aim, she is not yet in the 
business of forming a belief. Deliberating over whether to adopt the aim with 
respect to a particular proposition is not a context in which one is already being 
guided by that aim.  
Steglich-Petersen’s claim is that the truth-aim is present in other 
deliberative contexts, and in some of those (such as whether to adopt that aim), 
the aim can be weighed. He notes that “the aim one might take up as a result of 
deliberating whether to pursue the truth aim with respect to some p, is the very 
aim that constrains deliberation over whether to believe that p.”11 So in the 
context of deliberating over whether to form a belief about p, one is working with 
the aim of belief (alongside others), in a stage prior to the belief-formation process. 
We agree that deliberation on the question whether to form a belief about p 
gives way to practical considerations, and that if the truth-aim were present in 
such deliberation, then it would be weighed (perhaps against considerations 
regarding time or effort). But as we argued previously, deliberation over whether 
to adopt the aim of ϕ-ing takes place in a context prior to ϕ-ing, and so does not 
(perhaps cannot) involve the aim of ϕ-ing itself. That is not to say one cannot 
adopt the aim of ϕ-ing without actually beginning the process of ϕ ing (aims can 
be dropped upon further reflection), but only to say that the deliberative context 
in which one considers whether to adopt the aim to ϕ, is not one in which that 
very aim plays a role.   
Compare deliberating over whether to adopt the aim of running only if it is 
sunny outside. Deliberation over whether to adopt this aim will presumably 
include considerations of time, effort, injury-proneness, and so on. But to say that 
                                                                
11 Steglich-Petersen “Weighing Again,” 145. 
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this deliberative context is one in which the running-aim itself plays a role is, it 
seems to us, implausible, and at the very least, in need of argument.  
Here is one way of thinking about the disagreement here. Steglich-
Petersen’s truth-aim can be read as a description of what the agent is up to once it 
is settled for her which proposition(s) to subject to doxastic deliberation (a point 
we made previously with respect to the possibility that Steglich-Petersen might 
opt for an if and only if aim).12 Suppose that for a set of propositions S1, the agent 
aims to believe that p if and only if p is true. Now we can ask, how is the set itself 
chosen – that is, how does the agent decide to adopt the truth aim for S1 instead of 
S2? Say that S1 is a set of propositions about what the weather will be like today, 
and S2 is a set of propositions about which student broke the classroom window. 
Presumably what settles one’s adopting the 'if and only if' truth-aim towards one 
of these sets is a matter of Owens’s formulation (if you are to form beliefs about 
the propositions in S1 they had better be true), and practical considerations. If it is 
important to my goals to form a true belief about what the weather will be like 
today, and/or if it would be troubling to form a true belief about who broke the 
classroom window, I might decide to believe all and only true propositions in S1. 
But now we see that Steglich-Petersen’s truth aim is not weighed against anything 
else, rather what we have is Owens’s aim plus practical interests interacting. And 
this, of course, takes place at a stage prior to Steglich-Petersen’s aim playing a role 
(if it does, see §4.4).  
Our original charge was that Steglich-Petersen equivocated between 
deliberating over whether to form a belief about p and deliberating over whether 
to believe that p. He responded by noting that there is no such equivocation, that 
these are indeed different deliberative contexts, but that the truth-aim is at work 
in both of them (and weighed in the former). We replied here that the truth-aim 
is not at play in the context of deliberation over whether to adopt that exact aim 
and towards which proposition(s).  
4.4 Weighing Simpliciter Is Not the Point 
As a final point, even if the truth aim were being weighed in a context prior to 
that of doxastic deliberation, that hardly shows that belief formation is governed 
by an aim. Rather, all that would be shown is that there is a truth-aim that can be 
weighed, and that (perhaps independently) belief formation follows rules that 
enable beliefs to be true. Just because a certain aim is weighed in deciding whether 
to deliberate over p does not mean that that aim is adopted in belief formation. It 
                                                                
12 Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof, “A Defence of Owens,” 454. 
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could just be that the process of belief formation is such that its outputs are in 
accordance with the aim. When the process of deliberation is going on, the 
process no longer has the distinctive feature of being guided by the aim (after all, 
we might take guidance by the aim to be revealed by its being weighed against 
other aims). Consider the rules of a game. The rules may have been chosen to 
make the game pleasurable. But when one buys in and follows the rules, one does 
not allow pleasure to be weighed against other things. Likewise, on what grounds 
does Steglich-Petersen take bare weighability of the truth-aim in some context to 
support the claim that that aim is what structures the nature of some other 
context, that of belief formation? 
5. Conclusions  
We have again defended Owens’s objection to beliefs having aims, this time from 
Steglich-Petersen’s replies to our previous work on this issue. We agreed with 
Steglich-Petersen that the adoption of conditional aims can be preceded by 
deliberation over whether to adopt the aim in question, but argued that – unlike 
other conditional aims – one cannot go ahead and believe if the condition for 
believing specified by the aim is not met. One cannot ignore the prescription of 
the aim of belief. Indeed, it is this which motivated Owens’s objection in the first 
place.13  
We argued that if the truth aim is to be characterized as having the truth of 
p as sufficient for belief that p, that aim needs to be present in deliberation over 
whether to take up the truth aim, for there to be a case of the aim being weighed. 
But this is not so; deliberation over whether to adopt the aim is prior to 
deliberation structured by that aim, Steglich-Petersen has mistaken the 
interaction of the only if truth-aim with other interests for the weighing of the if 
and only if truth-aim.  
Finally, we claimed that even if Steglich-Petersen were right that the truth 
aim is weighed in a context prior to belief formation, that does not show that 
belief formation itself is governed by an aim. 
Thus we claim, again, that Owens’s challenge to the truth-aim approach 
remains to be answered. 
                                                                
13 For other explanations of why the prescription of the truth-aim cannot be ignored see Paul 
Noordhof, “Believe What You Want,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (2001): 247-
265; and Ema Sullivan-Bissett, “Explaining Doxastic Transparency: Aim, Norm, or Function?” 
Synthese (forthcoming). For limits to the prescription of the truth-aim see Paul Noordhof, “Self-
Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
LXVII, 1 (2003): 75-100.   
